In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: allow ext4_get_group_info() to fail Previously, ext4_get_group_info() would treat an invalid group number as BUG(), since in theory it should never happen. However, if a malicious attaker (or fuzzer) modifies the superblock via the block device while it is the file system is mounted, it is possible for s_first_data_block to get set to a very large number. In that case, when calculating the block group of some block number (such as the starting block of a preallocation region), could result in an underflow and very large block group number. Then the BUG_ON check in ext4_get_group_info() would fire, resutling in a denial of service attack that can be triggered by root or someone with write access to the block device. For a quality of implementation perspective, it's best that even if the system administrator does something that they shouldn't, that it will not trigger a BUG. So instead of BUG'ing, ext4_get_group_info() will call ext4_error and return NULL. We also add fallback code in all of the callers of ext4_get_group_info() that it might NULL. Also, since ext4_get_group_info() was already borderline to be an inline function, un-inline it. The results in a next reduction of the compiled text size of ext4 by roughly 2k.
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